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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

JESUS A. JIMENEZ,

:

Case No. 2Q080892-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) (2008). Appellant Jesus A. Jimenez filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court's judgment and conviction for criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1973 as amended) and aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1973 as amended) to the
Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. The
judgment is attached as Addendum A. (R. 131-132).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND
GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
I.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
A.

Issue: Whether the defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss as

1

to the aggravated robbery charges at the end of the State's case, for a directed verdict at
the close of all the evidence, or request a proper jury instruction and object to the
dangerous weapon enhancement instructions given by the trial court, constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.

Standard of Review: The standard of review with respect to the

issue of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Perry, 2009 UT. App. 51, 1 9;
State v. Cox, 2007 UT. App. 317,1f 10, 169 P.3d 806.
C.

Grounds for Review: Defense counsel's failure to move for

dismissal of the aggravated robbery charge is found at 149:8; failure to move for a
directed verdict at 149:17, 18, 24, 25; and failure to object and acceptance of the courts
proposed jury instructions is found at 149:25. The set of instructions given to the jury (R.
109-124) is attached as Addendum B. The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was
not raised in the trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Harper, 2006 UT App 178, If 7 , 136 P.3rd 1261. Review of a claim of due process
violation for ineffective assistance of counsel presents an exception to the preservation
rule. State v. Perry, 2009 UT. App. 51,19.
II. Plain Error.
Issue: Whether the trial court's failure to sua sponte dismiss the aggravated
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robbery charge at the end of the State's case or to direct a verdict of dismissal at the close
of all the evidence constituted plain error.
Standard of Review: The standard of review with respect to the
commission of plain error is that the trial court's ruling will be reversed only if (i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the defendant. Id; State v. Diaz-Aravalo, 200$ UT App 219, f 8 (June,
2008).
A.

Grounds for Review: The factual underpinnings of this issue, i.e.,

failure to dismiss sua sponte the aggravated robbery charge may be found at 149:8 and
149:17-25; the courts proposed jury instructions are referenced in the trial transcript at
149:25, may be found at R. 109-124, and are included in Addendum B. The issue of plain
error was not raised in the trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal as an
exception to the preservation rule. State v. Perry, 2009 UT. App. 51, f 9; State v. Harper,
2006 UT App 178, f 7, 136 P.3rd 1261.
III. Manifest Injustice.
A.

Issue: Whether the trial court's failure to properly instruct the

jury as to the elements off 76-3-203.8, Utah Code Ann. (2003), Increase of Sentence if
Dangerous Weapon Used, requiring a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
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defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present," amounted to manifest injustice
requiring reversal.
B.

Standard of Review: The manifest injustice standard is generally

synonymous with the plain error standard. State v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, \ 10, 131 P. 3
1046. The standard of review with respect to the commission of plain error is that the
trial court's ruling will be reversed only if (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. Id; State v.
Diaz-Aravalo, 2008 UT App 219, % 8 (June, 2008)
C.

Grounds for Review: The trial court's jury instructions are

referenced in the trial transcript at 149:25, may be found at R. 109-124, and Addendum B.
The trial court's increased sentence on the aggravated robbery from five years to life to
six years to life is found at R. 132. The issue of manifest injustice was not raised in the
trial court, but may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116,
121-122; State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, f 7, 136 P.3 1261.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes are relevant to the issues and set forth at Addendum C:
1.

Criminal homicide, murder, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003).
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2. Aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 766-302 (2003).
3. Robbery, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301
(2004).
4. Felony Conviction - indeterminate term of imprisonment under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203(2003).
5. Increase of Sentence if Dangerous Weapon Used, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.8
(2003),
6. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of
another, §76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated.
The following rules are relevant to the issues and set forth at Addendum D:
1.

Rule 19(e) Utah R. Crim. P.

2.

Rule 22(e) Utah R. Crim. P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASfi
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS,
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

In August 2007, the State charged Mr. Jimenez with Criminal Homicide, murder, a
first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1973 as amended), and
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(2003). (R. 1-3) In December 2007, the trial court bound Jimenez over for trial on the
charges. (R. 36-37) Jimenez was arraigned and trial was scheduled for June 2008. (R.
5

41-42)
The trial began on June 24, 2008 (R. 76-79), and on June 25 the jury found him
guilty as charged. (R. 78-79) On September 18, 2008, the trial court sentenced Jimenez
as follows: for count one, Murder, it ordered him to serve an indeterminate prison term of
fifteen years and which may be for life; and for count two, Aggravated Robbery, it
ordered him to serve an indeterminate prison term of not less than six years and which
may be for life, with both counts to run consecutively. (R. 131-132). On October 17,
2008, Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. (R. 136-137). The notice is timely. See Utah R.
App. P. 3 & 4 (2008). Jimenez is incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE.
At about 3:45 p.m. on August 15, 2007 Faviola Hernandez's ("Favi") was dropped
her off by her mother at her beauty salon, The Shop, along with Laura Hernandez,
Faviola's 12 year old little sister, and her six year old little brother, Junior Hernandez. (R.
148:15, 32) She was coming from her other job. Her little brother was going to get a
haircut. (R. 148:44) Lionel Hernandez, who had been getting his hair cut by Faviola for
about a year, was waiting for her to get a haircut. (R. 148:20-21, 44)
The Shop is located at 1331 West California, Salt Lake City (West Valley), Salt
Lake County, at the intersection of California and Navajo. (R. 148: 116, 136) The
children, Laura and Junior, stayed inside a little while and then went across the street to
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the playground to play. The playground can be seen through the door of The Shop, and
Faviola came out once or twice and yelled "La La," checking on them. (R. 148:34, 39,
45).
Laura testified that it seemed like they were a long time at the playground "but (it)
probably wasn't." (148:46) After a while, the children went back to The Shop because it
was too hot outside and sat in the chairs in a little waiting room and looked at magazines
for about 10 minutes. (R. 148:42, 46)
When Laura and her little brother were at the playground, Laura testified, she
observed that a green car kept driving back and forth. (R. 148:35) She saw this car
driving northbound on Navajo and slow down south of The Shop. She was chasing her
little brother when she first saw it, but it caught her eye because it slowed down. (R.
148:50) She thought it was probably one of Faviola's clients because it started to slow
down like it was going to park, but kept going straight and turned westbound on
California. (R. 148:36) When she saw it again it was coming eastbound on California,
and went slow as it got closer to The Shop. Then, she testified, she saw it again
westbound on California and it kept going straight. The car would slow down and then
step on the gas. (R. 148:36, 37) She recognized the car because it was going slower,
even slower than before. She thought to herself that it was probably lost. (R. 148:38)
She didn't get a license plate or make of car, and thought it had 4 doors, but
couldn't specifically recall. She thought the windows were tinted a little. She was unable
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to identify the driver. She testified that she saw a guy driving the car "like a shadow
because I was pretty far so I couldn't really make out." She said she saw a guy driving
and some blonde hair. She testified that later she informed the police that she saw blonde
hair from, "like, the back." (R. 148:49)
Laura identified Exhibit 8 as a photograph of the green car she had seen next to the
school (R. 148:39), Exhibits 9 and 10 as photographs of the green car on Navajo street (R.
148:40), and Exhibit 12 as a photograph of the green car next to The Shop (R. 148:40).
Brian Alders, an electronic technician employed with the Salt Lake City School
District maintenance department testified. His primary involvement with the school
district involved surveillance of all schools in the district. All of the schools in Salt Lake
City School District are connected in this system of surveillance cameras, which is
monitored through network remote software at the district maintenance office at 1005
West Beardsley Place in Salt Lake City. (R. 148:124, 129) There are surveillance
cameras at Mountain View Elementary and in Glendale Middle School, approximately 16
per building. (R. 148:113)
The personnel at the various schools are trained to review the video recordings
made by the cameras, and they are used by staff. (R. 148:124-125) If a problem is
observed with one of the cameras from the main office, however, either Ahlers or his
partner, the only other individuals trained to maintain the system, must go to the particular
school to make the repair. The cameras require constant maintenance, with such matters
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as blown fuses, insects, rain, and a variety of problems associated with electronic devices
out in the weather. (R. 148:123, 127) The cameras have a digital recording unit and a
clock which was set when the system was installed. The time is reviewed twice a year for
accuracy. (R. 148:117)
Mr. Alhers testified that he is called upon by the police from time to time to review
the material that is recorded by the cameras, which can be preserved on CD, and would
otherwise after a period of time be overwritten by the system. (R. 148:125)
He was contacted by the Salt Lake Police Department about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. on
August 15, 2007 to review the cameras, approximately 6, pointed in the direction of the
beauty shop at California and Navajo. (R. 148:116) Mountain View Elementary school
is closest to California and Navajo with 16 cameras scattered inside and outside. Just
south is Glendale intermediate with 13 cameras. (R. 148:115) He was asked to review
the tapes between 3:30 and 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. and obtained footage from four of the
cameras. (R. 148:115) One of the cameras is a static camera pointing toward California.
The other three are pan/tilt/zoom cameras, pre-programmed in a pattern covering most of
the grounds and places of interest to be watched. (R. 148:118) It is not entirely clear
from the record which of the schools' cameras captured the images which were made into
exhibits for use during trial, however Mr. Ahlers identified Exhibits 8 through 15 as stills
from the north side of Mountain View Elementary School. (R. 148:115) He testified,
without objection as to foundation from defense counsel, that he had checked the times
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recorded on the images taken for accuracy, and they were correct. (R. 148:118) At least
one of the identified exhibit photographs indicated that it was taken at 4:31 p.m. on
August 15, 2007. (R. 148:121)
Cassandra Matern testified under a grant of use immunity. (R. 148:5-6)
Cassandra is the erstwhile girlfriend of Mr. Jimenez. They were boyfriend and girlfriend,
dating on August 15, 2007, and Jimenez is the father of their daughter born April 8, 2007.
(R.148:56-7) She has another child two years old by a different father. (R.148:81) Both
Jimenez and the father of her other child speak Spanish. Both fathers speak English, but
they also speak Spanish and have Spanish speaking friends. (R. 148:82) She on the other
hand, although she dates Spanish speaking people, speaks and understands very little
Spanish herself, according to her testimony. (R. 148:65, 82)
On August 15, 2009, Jimenez picked her up at about 3:00 p.m. or little after, 3:30
p.m. Then they picked up her father a little after 3:00 p.m. He cashed his check and "we
took him either to Trax or home." (R. 148:58) Cassandra's father, Llewellyn Craig
Matem, testified that they, Jimenez and Cassandra, dropped "the babies" off at Trax at
about 3:31 p.m. and his wife and he took Trax back to their home in Midvale with the
children. (R. 148:104-5) Mr. Jimenez drove the green Honda vehicle, which he and
Cassandra purchased together in his name, and that she paid for but that she did not often
drive. (R. 148:61, 85, 105) Jimenez always drove the Honda and her father never saw
him driving other cars. (R. 148:111)
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After leaving the Trax station at 1300 South, Jimenez drove the Accord, which
Cassandra testified was "(g)reen with rims and four doors" (R. 148:61) to pick up Miguel
Mateos (a.k.a. "Toker"), whom she met through Jimenez and had know for about a
month, in Rose Park around Redwood Road and 6th North. (R. 148:59-60) Mateos,
wearing Levis and a white t-shirt, rode in the front, she in the back. (R. 148:60, 64) From
there they drove around a little while and then drove around The Shop (which she
testified was called The Bushwhacker) four or five times, during which time Jimenez and
Mateos "talked a little bit but in Spanish." (R. 148:61, 64) On direct examination
Cassandra was asked what they said, to which she responded, "that she was alone."
Defense counsel's objection as to hearsay was sustained, however counsel made no
motion to strike the evidence, which had already come in. (R. 148:65)
Cassandra testified that "She had looked out, I think, maybe the third time we went
past." Her testimony was that she saw a girl, didn't know who it was, didn't see her face,
and didn't know what she was wearing, but observed that she had black hair. She saw her
inside looking out of the door on the Navajo side. (R. 148:65)
She testified that she got suspicious about the third time they went past The Shop
because they continued going past it. At a point in time Jimenez stopped the car south of
The Shop, Mateos disembarked "and me and Jesus flipped around. And then Jesus told
me to get down to the back seat. He told me that I better get down." At this point they
were going south on Navajo. "We had flipped the car around on Navajo. We were facing
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south. Yes, south. And then Jesus told me to get down. He told me I better get down."
(R. 148:65, 66)
At about that point, she testified, they didn't say anything else. Then she heard a
gunshot and told Jimenez to leave. He said, "no stop a second." I told him to leave and
he said no. She did not believe anything else was said at that point. (R. 148:68)
Leonel Hernandez testified that he saw, through the mirror at The Shop, a man
come in. The man was short, chubby and bald, wearing a plain white shirt, but he
couldn't recall his pants. Mr. Hernandez turned around and the man said, ff(g)ive me your
money," pointed a gun at him and told him to get on the ground. As the man had a gun in
his face, he complied and got down on the ground. He got a look at the gun, which he
described as chrome-ish, light gray, but didn't know if it was a revolver, automatic or
what kind. Faviola was there with her little brother and sister. The man kept asking for
money. Faviola was behind him and he couldn't see what she was doing. (R. 148:22-24,
29-30)
The man kept asking for money, and asked Hernandez for his wallet. He reached
for his wallet but the man told him to stay down on the floor. The man continued asking
Faviola for money, so Hernandez told her to just give him money. As he was on the floor
with a wallet in his hand, "that's when I heard a gunshot." At first he stayed still, then
when he turned around and saw the door and the man was gone he started getting up. He
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saw Faviola was standing by the door. "She let me know she had got shot." When she
told him she got shot, "my main priority was just to lock the door." (R. 148:22-24)
Hernandez locked the door. He had not seen her get shot, and only saw her after
she had gotten shot and told him so. He remembered Faviola telling the man that her
brother and sister were there and not to harm them. He reached for a phone and called
911, then grabbed the towel he had around his neck and tried to stop her bleeding. He
couldn't tell where she had been shot and did not at first see any blood. When she
collapsed to the ground, he noticed blood coming from her chest and she was fading
away. He told her to keep breathing, but she stopped breathing, gasped for air, and then
blood started coming out of her mouth and nose every time she tried to breath. A police
officer arrived first. Mr. Hernandez opened the door. The officer came in and ordered
everyone outside. (R. 148:26-28)
Laura Hernandez testified somewhat similarly. After she and her brother went
back to the shop, they were sitting in chairs in a little waiting room looking at magazines.
Then a man came in asking for money. He said "everybody on the floor," and repeated,
"everyone on the floor." He took out his gun and everyone got on the floor. He pointed
the gun at Laura and her little brother. Faviola said, "No. No, the kids. Don't hurt the
kids." Then she ran in the back room and "(w)ent to go, I g^ess, to get her gun that she
had for protection," and, "(w)hen she came back out I heard gunfire." She then identified
Exhibit 2 as the picture of, "(t)he guy that killed my sister." (R. 148:42-43)
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Laura described the gun used as silver cream bluish color with a leaf design like
"on the old Western movies." She couldn't remember if it was big or small in his hand.
She said when her sister went in the back, "I thought she was going to get her money but I
guess she got her gun." (R. 148:48)
She was not asked to describe the shooting. And she testified that she didn't see
where the man in the white shirt went when he left. After he left, the door was shut, she
saw nothing further, and she took her little brother to the room they had on the side. (R.
148:52)
According to the testimony of Cassandra Matem, when Miguel Mateos returned
from The Shop, he ran out and got into the back seat behind the driver and they left and
went to Wal-Mart at 13th South and Third West. They parked, Mateos got out of the car
and he and Jimenez got in the front of the vehicle and took the stereo out. "We got there
and they hid the gun behind the stereo. And I believe we went inside to Wal-Mart, me
and Jesus." (R. 148:69) When Mateos went to the front of the vehicle, he still had the
gun. Jesus took the stereo out of the dash put the gun behind and put the stereo back in.
"Then me and Jesus went into the Wal-Mart." Mateos stayed outside in the car and put
on a gray t-shirt. (R. 148:70) She couldn't specifically recall what occurred next, but
they left Wal-Mart, and either dropped Miguel Mateos off and went to a taco stand or
vice-versa. (R. 148:70)
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On direct examination Cassandra was shown Exhibit 8 and testified that she saw a
school and her green Honda going past The Shop. She als<^ recognized a white truck in
the picture which she says was there on August 15, 2007. She identified Exhibit 13,
recognizing the Honda and Mateos, "Toker," getting out, testifying that she recognized
the white t-shirt. She was shown Exhibit 14, wherein she testified that she saw the Honda
turn around, but no one else that she recognized. She was ^hown Exhibit 16, recognizing
the Honda parked next to the school pointing south in the opposite direction from where
they dropped "Toker" off. (R. 148:71-74)
On cross-examination, she was shown State's Exhibit 11. She denied recognizing
the car because of the dent in it or special striping and said $he recognized it because of
the color. There is no other car that color that was there like that. She believed it was her
car in the picture, however, because the pictures had the date imprinted on it. Had she not
seen the date she would not know it was her car. (R. 148:91,92)
Her description and at what point in time she observed the gun is unequivocal. It
was only after the shooting and at the Wal-Mart that she observed the gun. The questions
and answers, elicited on cross-examination, are as follows,
Q:

Did you get a look at this gun?

A:
Not really. I do believe it was silver. And I don't know what color the
handle was, maybe brown.
Q:
Do you remember when you went to the DA's Office and it was recorded?
Did you say it was black?
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A:
It was either black or brown, I wasn't sure. I know it was silver, like, not
the handle but the other part was silver. But I'm not - it was a darker color, the handle.
Q:

How close did you get to this gun?

A:

They were in the front and I was in the back and that's it.

A:

Yeah.

Q:

Okay. Toker is pretty wide - -

A:

Yes.

Q:

- - very fair to say.

A:

Yes.

Q:

He probably fits at least across his seat?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And were you leaning forward?

A:
No, I was just in the back. And I just saw when they put it in, like, into the
hole, that's it.
Q:

Okay. This hole, is this a stereo that fits in the dashboard?

A:

Yes.

Q:

So it's one that you can take out at night so no one steals it?

A:

Yes.

(R. 148:92-93).
On cross-examination Cassandra admitted that she had previously told three
different stories to the police, and that she had lied at the preliminary hearing which took
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place on December 12, 2007. (R. 148:77-8) She testified that she knew she could be in
trouble for that, but was not going to get in trouble because she made an arrangement
with the prosecutor to tell the story she had related during trial and that it was agreed not
to charge her with perjury, for her involvement in being at The Shop in August of 2007,
and not to charge her with obstruction or anything involving this case. (R. 148:78)
Gordon Parks, a homicide detective with the Salt L^ke Police Department, retired
March 24, 2008, testified that he was the case manager investigating the incident at The
Shop on August 15, 2007. He went to the scene, observed & very small beauty shopbarbershop, 2 haircutting stations, two small separate rooms, attached to a larger place
called Bushwhackers, which was entirely closed. Faviola Fernandez was still on the
scene, lying in southernmost room, deceased. (R. 148:136-137)
Although detective Parks spoke to Cassandra Matern briefly on August 16th when
she was picked up, other detectives conducted the full interview. (R. 148:137) It was
from their interview with Cassandra that they learned, indirectly, that she knew more
about the incident than what she was telling them. Detective Parks was responsible for
the media advisory, i.e., giving information to the news organizations. As such, as in
other such cases, there was certain "hold-back information" which was purposely not
given to the media. In this case, the media were specifically not given the information
that the victim, Faviola, had a gun. The hold back information was given to other two
detectives who took Cassandra's phone so she could not tip the defendant off. They
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questioned her and when Cassandra first indicated that she heard about this murder on the
news, divulging her knowledge that the victim had a gun, the police knew that she was at
least lying about her source of information if not degree of involvement. (R.148:138-139,
149)
As a result of information received from Cassandra, the defendant was arrested
driving a Honda vehicle on August 16, 2007. (R. 148:139, 140) The vehicle was
impounded, and a search warrant obtained and executed. (R. 148:140) Detective Parks
indicated, over defense counsel's objection, that fingerprints of Miguel Mateos were
lifted from the vehicle. The objection was sustained, however, no motion to strike or
admonish was made and the court gave no admonition to the jury. (R. 148:144)
Detective Parks indicated that the gun was never recovered. (R. 148:145) At the time of
trial, Miguel Mateos had not been apprehended. (R. 148:153)
The State rested its case at this point.
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel made a pro forma motion to
dismiss for failure to establish di prima facie case connecting the two crimes committed by
Miguel Mateos to Mr. Jimenez. In this case, all the State established, counsel briefly
noted, is a killer identified as Miguel Mateos "going in with a gun to do the robbery and
in the course of that robbery ended up killing someone." (R. 149:7-8). After this brief
statement was made, the following exchange took place between court and counsel:
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The Court: Do you believe that they have to show prior knowledge that he
had a gun on him?
Ms. Clark: No, just that he was going in~
The Court: To commit a robbery?
Ms. Clark: Commit the robbery, yes.
The Court: And you don't think that the testimony from Cassandra that they
drove around slowed down, did a Uey, and he told her to get down, that a
jury can't draw a reasonable inference from that, Ms. Clark, that he
understood what was happening?
Ms. Clark: If the court wants to rule that way.
The Court: I appreciate you making the motion. The motion is going to be
denied, clearly denied.
(R. 149:8).
Without further adieu, or an opening statement, defense counsel then commenced
the case for the defense by recalling Detective Parks to the witness stand:
Ms. Clark: My turn?
The Court: Yes, your turn.
Ms. Clark: Thank you, your honor. I would like to recall Detective Parks.
(R. 149:10)
The ensuing examination of detective Parks may safely be characterized as
immaterial to this appeal, adding nothing of significance to the factual understanding of
the murder-robbery of Faviola Hernandez. (R. 149:10-16).
C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
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The record does not reflect that the defendant offered any proposed jury
instructions. The State submitted proposed jury instructions. (R. 80-100). The
instructions given by the court (R. 109-124) at the close of all the evidence were approved
by counsel for both parties. Counsel for the State acknowledged that no instructions she
requested were not given, and that she was "satisfied with the instructions." (R. 149:2425). The court pointedly queried, "(w)ill counsel for the defendant acknowledge that
there are no instructions that counsel have requested that I have not given.'5 To which
counsel replied, "(y)es> I will acknowledge that."
(R. 149:25). The instructions, of course, contain a detailed aggravated robbery instruction
(R. 91) but, as one was not requested, no lesser included offense of simple robbery was
among the jury instructions.
Jury Instructions No. 41 and 42 (R. 122-123), included in Addendum E, are of
particular importance relative to the "dangerous weapon enhancement" feature of the
subsequent sentencing.
D. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
Defense counsel made no motion for a directed verdict. (R. 149:17-25)
E. JURY VERDICT.
The jury found the defendant guilty as to the charge of criminal homicide, murder,
R. 125, aggravated robbery, R. 126, and that a dangerous weapon was used in the
commission of the aggravated robbery, R. 126. The verdict forms are included in
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Addendum F.
F. SENTENCE.
On September 18, 2008, the trial court sentenced Jirhenez as follows: for count
one, Murder, it ordered him to serve an indeterminate prison term of fifteen years and
which may be for life; and for count two, Aggravated Robbery, it ordered him to serve an
indeterminate prison term of not less than six years and which may be for life, with both
counts to run consecutively. (R. 131-132).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A. By failing at the close of the State's case to mov0 to dismiss Count II of the
Information, the aggravated robbery charge, to move for a directed verdict at the close of
all the evidence (or request a lesser included offense of robbery instruction), and in failing
to object to the trial court's dangerous weapon instruction ot request a proper instruction,
counsel's performance was professionally deficient and ineffective, which deficiency
prejudiced the defense and affected the substantial rights of|the defendant, requiring
reversal.
B. The trial court erred in failing to sua sponte dismiss Count II of the Information
for insufficient evidence and failure of the State to establish & prima facie case of
aggravated robbery at the close of the State's case. The court also failed to direct a
verdict of not guilty as to the aggravated robbery at the clos$ of all the evidence. This
constituted plain error requiring reversal.
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C. The trial court erred in failing to correctly instruct the jury with respect to the
elements necessary for the jury to find with respect to the "dangerous weapon
enhancement" in order to lawfully sentence the defendant to an increased minimum
sentence (an increase of from five years to life, to six years to life). This error in
instructing the jury rose to the level of manifest injustice requiring reversal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE TO DISMISS, MOVE FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT AS TO THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
CHARGE, OR REQUEST A PROPER INSTRUCTION REQUIRING
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF
THE DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENT, DEPRIVED THE
DEFENDANT OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
A. STANDARD RESPECTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A defendant is required to
establish (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient/' and (2) "that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ^ 16, (Utah, February
2008) quoting Strickland at 687. As to the first prong of Strickland,
The seriousness of those errors is measured by whether
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness." Specifically, "[a] convicted defendant...
must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged
not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.
(Footnotes omitted)

22

State v. Eyre, at ^f 16, quoting Strickland at 687, 688.
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT.
1. Standard For Motion To Dismiss/Directed Verdict.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss or for a directed verdict is a question
of law reviewed for correctness giving no particular deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, 167 P. % 15; State v. Krueger, 1999 Ut.
App. 54,1f 10, 975 P.2d 489. ""A defendant's motion to di$miss for insufficient evidence
at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the tri|d court to determine whether
the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense.'" State v.
Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, ^ 15,122 P.3d 895 quoting Skate v.Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,
1f 40, 70 P.3d 111 (citations omitted).
When a party moves for a directed verdict on a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, "we will uphold the trial court's decision if, upon|reviewing the evidence and
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, % 15, 167 P.3d
503 quoting State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.
2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)) (alteration in original).
It is not, however, within the trial court's province to assess the weight to be given
the evidence.
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When evaluating a motion for a directed verdict ""the court is
not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury,
whose prerogative it is to judge the facts.'" Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at
*[f 18 (quoting Mgmt. Comm. Of Grays tone Pines Homeowners Ass 'n v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1982)). Rather, the
court's role is to determine whether the state has produced "believable
evidence" on each element of the crime from which a jury, acting
reasonably, could convict the defendant.
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 32, 84 P.3d 1183. On the other hand, circumstantial
evidence alone may be sufficient to sustain the trial court's determination to give the case
to the jury. Id., *l 33.
Inferences, however, which are remote or speculative constitute an impermissible
basis upon which to submit a case to the jury. State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah
App. 1998) quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,344 (Utah 1997). The "fabric of
evidence against the defendant must cover the gap between the presumption of innocence
and the proof of guilt." Id. quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-445 (Utah 1983).
2. Lack of Factual Basis to Submit Aggravated Robbery to Jury.
Drawing all inferences in a light favorable to the verdict, the facts in this case
simply do not give rise to an reasonable inference that Jimenez was an active participant
with respect to the use of a gun by Miguel Mateos. In fact there is no evidence - nothing
- which would tend to indicate, or from which an inference could be drawn that this
defendant, Jesus Jimenez, was even aware that Miguel Mateos was carrying a gun
between the time period he was picked up in Rose Park and his returning after the
incident at The Shop to get back into the vehicle.
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Certainly there is evidence from the testimony of Cassandra Matern that both she
and Jimenez were aware of the gun after Mateos returned from The Shop. The first and
only time which she indicates she saw the gun was when she was at the Wal-Mart in the
back seat and Mateos and Jimenez were in the front seat pitting the gun in the stereo hole
in the dashboard. (R. 148:92-93) Nothing about her testimony would tend to indicate,
however, that prior to that time either she or Jimenez had any awareness of the presence
of a gun. The evidence most favorable to such a position i^ the highly speculative
possibility that since Mateos had on only a t-shirt, it might have been difficult to conceal a
gun. Given that he was apparently quite heavyset (R. 148:30, 93), even that speculation is
unfounded, and there is no testimony to that effect from Ca$sanda. In fact, every
reasonable inference to be drawn from reading Cassandra Matern's testimony points
toward the impression that she was surprised when she heard a shot coming from The
Shop. The testimony of Cassandra that Jimenez did not waiiit to leave, at her urging, at
that point, (R. 148:68) is wholly inconclusive and much too speculative to support an
inference that he had prior knowledge that Mateos had a gun. Everything known about
the gun from the transcript comes from inside The Shop frotn the inhabitants, or from
Cassandra in her description of the gun when she observed it later at Wal-Mart as Mateos
and Jimenez were putting it in the console of the vehicle. (R. 148:92-93).
Beyond rank speculation, there is no factual basis for an inference that either
Cassandra Matern or Jesus Jimenez knew that Mateos possessed or intended to use a gun
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when he disembarked from the vehicle to go into The Shop. A sort of post hoc ergo
propter hoc reasoning must be indulged to infer that either knew that there was a gun
prior to Cassandra hearing the gunshot and the return of Mateos from The Shop. This is
insufficient evidence from which one could sensibly say that the "fabric of evidence
against the defendant... cover(s) the gap between the presumption of innocence and the
proof of guilt." State v. Lyman, supra, at 281.
3. Aggravated Robbery/Robbery.
Utah Code section 76-6-301 defines aggravated robbery as the "intentional tak[ing
of] personal property in the possession of another . . . by means of force" where in the
course of committing the robbery, the defendant "uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Id. §§ 76-6-30l(l)(a), -302(1 )(a) (emphasis
added). Further, Utah code section 76-l-601(5)(a) defines a "dangerous weapon" as "any
item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."
While the Information under which Jimenez was charged refers to Jimenez as a
principal actor, the State pegged criminal liability, as it must, on a theory of complicity,
i.e., that Jimenez drove the getaway car to and from the robbery. He never actually used a
weapon or interacted with the victim.1 To establish criminality under a theory of
accomplice liability, the State is required to prove that Jimenez "acted with both the intent
1

Under Utah law, accessory liability is not charged as a separate offense. Rather, it is a
theory under which liability results. See State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, If 16 (stating that
"the nature of accomplice liability makes it impossible for the State to charge an
individual with accomplice liability standing alone").
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that the underlying offense be committed and the intent to kid the principal actor in the
offense." State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, \ 13. In other words, "an 'accomplice' is one who
participates in a crime in such a way that he could be charged and tried for the same
offense." State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977). "Every person acting with
the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2003).
Consequently, under the plain language of the aggravated robbery statute, the
prosecution's burden to present evidence on each element of the charged crime, and
Utah's accessory liability law, the State could establish a prima facie case that Jimenez
committed aggravated robbery only by presenting evidence to support a reasonable belief
that Jimenez intentionally aided or encouraged Mateos with (1) the intentional taking; (2)
of property; (3) from another; (4) by means of force; (5) while using or threatening to use
a dangerous weapon. See Id. §§ 76-6-30 l(l)(a), 302(1 )(a) (2003). In light of this
requirement, counsel erred in failing to move to dismiss the State's case for aggravated
robbery because the State failed to present any evidence indicating that Jimenez intended,
or even knew, that a dangerous weapon was going to be used during the commission of
the underlying robbery.
Utah's statutory scheme and case law make a distinction between simple and
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aggravated robbery. In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme
Court explicitly stated that courts ffmust observe th[e] critical distinction between robbery
and aggravated robbery." Id. at 965.
Every robbery does not involve a weapon. Defense counsel completely failed to
argue that the State had not established & prima facie case because it had not presented
any evidence indicating that Jimenez intended or even knew that a weapon was going to
be used in the underlying crime. When the trial court asked defense counsel about this
lack of evidence., counsel in effect shrugged and impliedly indicated that the court could
infer that Jimenez knew about the weapon, under the apparent belief that all robberies
involve weapons. (R. 149:8) This is a particularly egregious omission given the plain
language, as discussed in Point III infra, of ^{76-3-203.8, Increase of Sentence if
Dangerous Weapon Used, Utah Code Ann. (2003), in which the legislature saw fit to
explicitly require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that a
dangerous weapon was being used in the commission of a crime.
Allowing Jimenez' conviction to stand would undermine Utah's statutory scheme
f,

and erode the statutory distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Suniville,

1A\ P.2d at 965. Utah law clearly requires more. The State must present some evidence
indicating that Jimenez intended to aid Mateos with a robbery involving a dangerous
weapon. See, e.g., In re M.B., 2008 UT App 433,ffl[13,17 (discussing Utah's "presence
plus other factors" requirement to support an inference of participation); In re V.T., 2008
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UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234 ("Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one
an accomplice to a crime absent evidence showing—beyond a reasonable doubt—that
defendant advise[d], instigate[d], encourage[d], or assist[e4] in perpetration of the crime."
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted))^ State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d
120, 123-24 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (reversing defendant's conviction for attempted
criminal homicide under an accomplice liability theory because even though defendant
was present "during the shooting's planning and commission11 he did not" advise,
instigate, encourage, or assists in perpetration of the [shooting]."); See also State v. Smith,
706 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Utah 1985) (imposing accomplice liability for aggravated
robbery where defendant took an active role in planning and carrying out the aggravated
robbery); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same).
In further support of the position that the State is required to present some
evidence indicating that Jimenez intended the use of a weapon during the underlying
crime, compare Utah's aggravated robbery statute with its aggravated burglary statue.
The aggravated robbery statute at issue in this case narrowly prohibits the actor's
intentional use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6301, 302 (2003) ("A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon."). In contrast, Utah's
aggravated burglary statute imposes liability where any participant uses a weapon in the
underlying burglary. More precisely, the aggravated burglary statute states that "[a]
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person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a
burglary the actor or another participant in the crime . . . uses or threatens the immediate
use of any . . . dangerous weapon." Id. § 76-6-203(1 )(c) (2003). The difference between
these two statutes is illuminating.
Based on the language of the aggravated burglary statute, an accessory to burglary
will face liability for aggravated burglary where any participant in the underlying burglary
uses or threatens to use a weapon. The statute obviates the mens rea requirement
otherwise imposed by accomplice liability law.
The aggravated robbery statute, however, is not so broad. Absent similar language
widely extending liability, the aggravated robbery statute only extends liability to codefendants within the confines of accessory liability law. In other words, to be liable for
aggravated robbery, an accessory must have "solicited], requested], command[ed],
encourage[ed], or intentionally aid[ed]" his co-defendants with the intentional use or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon during the underlying robbery. Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-202 (2003). Had the legislature intended otherwise, it would have included the
same language in both the aggravated burglary and the aggravated robbery statute. See
State v. Richardson, 2006 UT App 238, \ 13, 139 P.3d 278 ("When interpreting the plain
language of a particular statute, 'courts presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly .. . .,ff (quoting State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, \ 7, 73 P.3d 978)).
Where federal enhancement statutes criminalize the "use" of a dangerous weapon,
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federal courts require the same type of evidence. For example, analyzing a federal
statute imposing criminal liability on an accessory where, as here, a dangerous weapon
was used during the commission of a violent crime, the Fifth Circuit explains that the
prosecution must do more than establish that the defendant intended to aid in the
underlying crime. See United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d 750, 757-58 (5th Cir.
2005). Rather, the prosecution must show that the defendant intentionally aided or
encouraged the use of the dangerous weapon. See Id. More specifically, the Fifth
Circuit states that where the statute at issue criminalizes an accomplice for the "use" of a
firearm, "the prosecution must prove that the defendant fact(ed] with the knowledge or
specific intent of advancing the 'use1 of the firearm.1" Id. at 758 (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1998)). The prosecution
must establish that the defendant intended to facilitate in the aggravating aspect of the
crime:
[Tjhere must be evidence that the defendant took some action to facilitate
or encourage the use or carrying a firearm. The link to the firearm is
necessary because the defendant is punished as a principal for 'using1 a
firearm . . . and therefore must facilitate in the 'use' of the firearm rather
than simply assist in the crime underlying the [enhancement] violation/"

Id. (omission in original) (quoting Sorrells, 145 F.3d at 754).
This evidentiary requirement, which federal courts refbr to as the "active
participation requirement," may be satisfied where an accessary took part in planning the
overall scheme or design for the crime or knew that guns weUe going to be used "and that
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he took an affirmative act to encourage the use of the gun." United States v. Thompson,
454 F.3d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). However, the active participation
requirement is not satisfied where, as here, the defendant was merely a driver who
participated tangentially in the underlying crime. See Id. (reversing the defendant's
conviction for "aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during a crime of
violence in contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)" where the evidence failed to
indicate that the defendant knew or encouraged the use of a weapon.).
The active participation requirement derives from the United States Supreme Court
cast, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137(1995). See generally Id. (interpreting 18
U.S.C.A. § 924 (c)(1) (amended)), superseded by statute. Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L.
No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469). In that case, the Supreme Court analyzed the reach of a
federal statute that narrowly criminalized the "use" of a weapon during the commission of
a violent crime. See Id. at 150. Persuaded by the plain meaning of the word "use," the
Court held that where a statute criminalizes the use of a dangerous weapon, there must be
evidence that the defendant "actively] employ [ed]" the weapon during the commission of
the underlying crime. Id. In response to Bailey, Congress amended the statute the Court
was interpreting so as to reach a broader array of conduct. See United States v. Pleasant,
125 F.Supp.2d 173, 180-81 (E.D. Va. 2005) (describing Congress's reaction to Bailey).
In its current form, the federal weapons enhancement statute broadly criminalizes using or
carrying a gun "during and in relation to" a violent crime or possessing a gun "in
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furtherance of1 a violent crime. See Id. at 180. In contrast], Utah's aggravated robbery
statute is crafted much more narrowly. As previously explained, Utah's aggravated
robbery statute criminalizes only the actual use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1 )(a) (2003).
Consequently, to impose liability for aggravated robbery on a principal, the
prosecution must show that the defendant actively employe^ a weapon during the
commission of the underlying crime. To impose liability fqr aggravated robbery on Mr.
Jimenez, as an accessory, however, the prosecution must demonstrate that the accessory
intended the use or threatened use of the dangerous weapon. See State v. Briggs, 2008
UT 75, TJ13 (stating that an accomplice is one who "acted with both the intent that the
underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the offense.");
In re M.B„ 2008 UT APP 433, f 10 (stating that Utah accomplice liability law requires
evidence of the accomplice's "active participation or involvement in the underlying
crime"). As this rule relates to this case, the prosecution ha$ not met its burden because it
has not established an affirmative connection between Jimenez and the weapon. The
prosecution has not established probable cause for aggravated robbery because Jimenez
was a passive participant in the underlying robbery. Consequently, counsel's error in
failing to move to dismiss was highly prejudicial.
Illuminating a result similar to the one required here, ^he Fifth Circuit bifurcated
criminal liability between co-defendants where there was insufficient evidence to indicate
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that one co-defendant "knew or intended that a gun would be used in the . . . robbery and
that he took an affirmative act to facilitate or encourage the use of a gun." United States
v. Thompson, 454 F.3d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). In that case, two codefendants had committed two robberies together, one in July and one in September. See
Id. at 462. Regarding the July robbery, there was evidence that defendant Carter had
participated in the crime by keeping watch over a nearby police station and acting as a
getaway driver. See Id. In the September robbery, there was evidence that Carter actually
purchased a gun from his brother and then provided it to his co-defendant to use in the
robbery. See Id. Carter was convicted of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a
violent crime for both robberies; however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction
relating to the July robbery. See Id. at 462,467. The court was particularly persuaded by
the fact that there was only "limited circumstantial evidence" attributing a connection
between Carter and the gun and "the perpetrators believed when planning the July robbery
that only one bank employee would have to be subdued in the course of the crime, which
by itself would not necessarily require the use of a gun." Id. at 466. This is clearly
applicable to the case at bar.
At the close of the State's evidence, counsel in the instant matter made an
indifferent motion to dismiss that the State had failed to establish Jimenez knowledge of
Miguel Mateos's intent to actually commit a robbery, and tossed away, with no apparent
thought, the requirement, articulated supra, that the State must prove that Mr. Jimenez
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possessed, at the very least, an awareness, which the evidence fails to support, that
Miguel Mateos had a gun when he disembarked from the Vehicle and entered The Shop.
(R. 149:8-9)
Defense counsel's failure to move to dismiss, for ^ directed verdict, or, at
the very least, request a lesser included offense instruction regarding robbery, was
deficient, i.e., "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment

The

seriousness of those errors is measured by whether "counsels' representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ^| 16,
179 P.3 792, quoting Strickland, supra, 456 U.S. 668, 687. Counsel's errors fell
below any such objective standard of reasonableness in this instance.
Counsel's failure cannot be mistaken for "trial strategy." While it is true that
appellate courts "give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical
decisions and will not question such decisions unless there i$ no reasonable basis
supporting them." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah Ct.App. 1998), here there
was no such reasonable basis for counsels failure to move toi dismiss the aggravated
robbery. There could only have been a benefit to making a njiotion to dismiss or for a
directed verdict. Had the trial court refused to dismiss outright, but instead reduced the
aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a not unlikely scenariq, the defendant would have
only been better off, notwithstanding that murder, under f 76^5-203 can be sustained
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utilizing either 1J76-5-203(l)(s) "Robbery under Section 76-6-301;' or ^j76-5-203(l)(t)
"Aggravated Robbery under Section 76-6-302." The failure to move to dismiss or for a
directed verdict served no useful strategy whatsoever. This court has observed,
Tf 33 Trial counsel's failure to argue this lack of evidence after
the State rested does not appear to have served a tactical purpose at
trial; nor has the State offered a possible tactical purpose on appeal.
"When no possible explanation or tactical reason exists for such a
decision, we have held that the first part of the [ineffective assistance
of counsel] test is satisfied." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^ 24
(citation omitted). We conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise
this lack of evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is "so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Wickham, 2002 UT 72 at Tf 19.
% 34 Moreover, we conclude that "but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
trial would have been different." Id (quotation and citation omitted).
Had trial counsel raised this lack of evidence, there is a reasonable
probability that the trial court would have dismissed the concealed weapon
charge. Cf. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, at % 8.
\ 35 The State argues that even had Smith's counsel moved for a
directed verdict based on a lack of evidence, the State could have
"properly and with little difficulty . . . moved to reopen and supply the
missing evidence." State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600,
601(1951). We are unconvinced. A trial court has discretionary
authority to determine whether to reopen a case to admit additional
evidence. See State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942).
Here, where the State obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of
the crime, we are not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily
allowed the State to reopen its case and supply the missing evidence.
Accordingly, because of trial counsel's ineffective assistance related to this
single charge, we reverse Smith's conviction for second-degree concealment
of a dangerous weapon and remand for a new trial on that count. (Footnote
omitted)
State v. Smith, 2003 Ut App 52,ffif33-35, 65 P.3d 648, 656.
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C.

COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE PREJUDICED
THE DEFENSE.

"In addition to demonstrating his counsel's deficiencies, the Strickland standard
requires that a defendant also show that those deficiencies effected the outcome of the
proceeding." Id. ^[17, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-692. This is clearly
demonstrable.
While there may have been evidence indicating th$t Jimenez intended to aid in
the underlying robbery, there was no evidence indicating hq intended the use of a weapon
or even that he knew a weapon was present. Once at The Shop, Jimenez did not go inside
or interact with the victim in any way. He only waited in thp car while Mateos went
inside. There is no evidence that Jimenez had prior knowledge or participated in a plan, if
Mateos actually planned to use the gun. Other than a circuntistantial connection indicating
knowledge of the gun after the occurrence of the robbery, tl^ere is no evidence whatsoever
that Jimenez had an affirmative connection to its actual use in the underlying crime.
Where there is no evidence linking Jimenez to the weapon, or even that he knew of its
existence, his conviction for aggravated robbery must be reversed. Counsel erred in
failing to advance the issue, even when pressed by the court, and the error was highly
prejudicial.
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Given defense counsel's failure to move to strike evidence which was heard by
the jury over her sustained objections2, her failure to make an opening statement of any
kind3, and, not to be too uncharitable, her somewhat unfocused cross-examinations,
together with the fact that she completely waived the critical issues respecting knowledge
of the defendant as to Mateos' possession and use of the gun, one might draw the
conclusion that the ineffectiveness of the assistance of counsel could be presumed to be
prejudicial on the basis that counsel "entirely fail(ed) to subject the prosecution's case to
meaningful adversarial testing." State v. Perry, supra, 2009 UT App 51, f 15, quoting
Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ^[32 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
(1984).
In any event, had defense counsel moved for dismissal or for a directed verdict,
or requested a lesser included robbery offense instruction, there is every reason to believe
that the result would have been different and favorable to Mr. Jimenez. State v.
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^|30, 63 P.3d 110. Had the court dismissed the aggravated
robbery charge outright, there would have been no basis upon which to convict Mr.
Jimenez of Murder under Section 76-5-203, U.C.A., as charged in the information (R. 13) or as defined injury instruction No. 35 (setting forth the elements of criminal
2

Asked what "they said" and Cassandra testified, "that she was alone." (R. 148:65).
Detective Parks testified that there was a fingerprint of Miguel Mateos taken from the
impounded vehicle. (R. 148:144-5)
3
Although counsel stated fTm waving and reserving my opening and reserving it for after
the state's case," (R. 148:19) she failed to make even an overture toward making an
opening statement at the close of the State's case. (R. 149:9-10)
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homicide, murder, R. 116), i.e., homicide during the course of a robbery). Needless to
say, this would have been a superior outcome.
Had counsel not performed in such a deficient manner in failing to make the
necessary motions to dismiss and/or for a directed verdict, there is a high probability that
the result would have been different. Thus, reversal of the convictions of aggravated
robbery and homicide murder, which was based upon a predicate offense of robbery, is
required.
Failing to request a jury instruction incorporating a lesser standard of culpability
than required for aggravated robbery, while such an omission (unlike counsel's failures to
make the appropriate motions) might be argued to be a tactical decision, was likely in this
case merely a lapse on the part of counsel. Which deficiency prejudiced the defendant.
The failure to request proper and appropriate instructions as to the dangerous
weapon enhancement verdict, and resulting sentence enhancement, was also a result of
deficient performance, probably a failure to read the enhancement statute, ^[76-3-203.8
Utah Code Ann. See jury instructions No. 41 and 42, to whi^h defense counsel failed to
object. This objective deficiency also amounted to harmful error as will be discussed in
more detail in Point III, infra.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUA SFONTE DISMISS
THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AMOUNTED
TO PLAIN ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL.
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A. THE PLAIN ERROR STANDARD.
Under the plain error doctrine, reversal is required if (i) an error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant.
State v. Cox, 2007 Ut. App. 317, f 10, 169 P.3 806.
B. THERE WAS ERROR.
For the reasons set forth in Point L B , supra, which are incorporated herein, there
was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilt as to the offense of aggravated
robbery. The court, of course, has the power to dismiss any count of the Information for
lack of evidence. See Rule 17 (p) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently
submission of the State's case to the jury on such a theory was erroneous.
C. THE ERROR WAS OBVIOUS.
There is some indication that the trial court was at least subliminally aware of the
error as it was occurring, viz., the trial court's question to counsel during her motion to
dismiss, "Do you believe that they have to show prior knowledge that he had a gun on
him?" (R. 149:8) While there may be no Utah case directly on all fours, the law is clear
and well settled as to the distinction between aggravated robbery and robbery, and the
facts of this case do not support the former. Thus, the error was obvious.
D.

THE ERROR WAS HARMFUL.
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An error is considered harmless when it is "'sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings." State v Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). Far from being
inconsequential, there is an evident reasonable likelihood that the error in this case
affected the outcome in the trial court. The error was extremely prejudicial to the
defendant, so that a reversal is required.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT THE JURY AND SUBMIT AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY
REQUIRING PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
DEFENDANT KNEW THAT A DANGEROUS WEAPON WAS PRESENT,
AMOUNTED TO MANIFEST INJUSTICE REQUIRING REVERSAL.
A. THE MANIFEST INJUSTICE STANDARD.
In claiming error by the lower court in instructing the jury sufficient to require
reversal, the defendant would seek to rely upon the plain error doctrine. Under the plain
error doctrine, reversal is required if (i) an error exists; (ii) #ie error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. State v. Cox, 2007
Ut App. 317, U 10, 169 PJ 806
However, the plain error doctrine has been repeatedly held to be unavailable
where defense counsel fails to object to the instructions given. Id. \19, citing State v
Hamilton, 2003 UT22, ] 54, 70 P. 3 111; and State v. Pindar, 2005 UT 15, ^ 61, 114 P.3
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551. Nevertheless, Rule 19(e) Utah R. Crim. P. provides a remedy where manifest
injustice has occurred:
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions
are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of
the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a
manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter
to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection. (Emphasis
added).
The distinction between the plain error standard and the manifest injustice
standard is of course largely semantic. The manifest injustice standard has been held to
be synonymous with the plain error standard. State v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, \ 10, 171 P.3
1046. Consequently, the manifest injustice standard is the aforementioned formulation,
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful.
B. THERE WAS ERROR.
Jury Instructions No. 41 and 42 (R. 122-123), Addendum F, are of particular
importance relative to the "dangerous weapon enhancement" feature of the subsequent
sentencing, state as follows:
Instruction No. 41
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or furtherance
of an Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is
subject to to (sic.) an increased penalty.
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Instruction No. 42.
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery
occurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an
enhanced penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an
enhanced penalty under Utah Law, you must find from all of the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that:
L

A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of
the Aggravated Robbery.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence iti this case, you are
convinced of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah
Law. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that the defendant is not
subject to an enhanced penalty.
For the reasons set forth in Point I B , supra, which are incorporated herein, even
assuming arguendo that evidence existed in support of submitting an enhancement
instruction to the jury, a position which the defendant does hot concede, there was error in
failing to instruct the jury as to the proper elements of the dangerous weapon
enhancement statute: ^f76-3-203.8, Increase of Sentence if Dangerous Weapon Used,
Utah Code Ann. (2003).
^[76-3-203.8, Increase of Sentence if Dangerous Weapon Used, Utah Code Ann.
(2003), states, in pertinent part, as follows:
76-3-203.8. Increase of sentence if dangerous weapon used.
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition
as in Section 76-1-601.
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous
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weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court:
(a)(i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the sentence
applicable by law; and
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zero, shall set the minimum
term as one year; and
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law in
the case of a felony of the second or third degree.
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the
felony; and
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present.
(Emphasis added)
Under this statute, which has been found to be constitutionally sound, State v.
AlfatlawU 2006 UT App 511, 153 P.3d 804, cert, denied, No. 20070144, 168 P.3d 819
(Utah June 12, 2007), the trier of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. This knowledge requirement
was not included in Instructions 41 or 42 in any meaningful way. Nor can such a
requirement be interpolated into instructions 41-42 by reading the full set of instructions
as a whole. The failure was clear error.
C. THE ERROR WAS OBVIOUS.
The error is readily apparent and should have been obvious to the trial court. It
is settled that "(T)he court has a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant law, and the court
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may, even over the defendant's objection, "give any instruction that is in proper form,
states the law correctly, and does not prejudice the defendant." State v. Low, 2008 Ut 58,
1J27, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). Taken as a whole, it cannot be said, as it must, that
the jury instructions given on the enhancement issue, 41 and 42, "fairly instructed the jury
on the applicable law." See State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ^18,132 P.3d 703
(citations omitted).
Failure of the trial court to properly instruct as to the critical element of the
enhancement statute, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's knowledge that
the dangerous weapon was present, was obvious error whicl)i merely compounded the
error as to failure of proof identified in Points I and II. The court failed to adopt the
essential language of Tf76-3-203.8, U.C.A., in any meaningful manner. Failing to include
all the elements of a criminal statute in a jury instruction is plain, clear, and obvious error.
In point of fact, as there was insufficient evidence to even siibmit the issue to the jury, as
elaborated in Point I, supra, no instruction of any kind should have been given on the
subject, as the statute does not apply.

D.

THE ERROR WAS HARMFUL.

An error is considered harmless when it is ""sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affepted the outcome of the
proceedings." State v. Verde, 110 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). Far from being
inconsequential, there is an evident reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
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outcome of sentencing by increasing the minimum penalty to which Mr. Jimenez was
sentenced by one year, from five years to life to six years to life. (R. 131-132)
As the erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find that a dangerous
weapon was used, without requiring a finding that the defendant was aware of its
presence beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict in that regard is unfounded and the
sentence is illegal.
An illegal sentence is reviewed for correctness. State v. Garner, 2008 UT App
32, TJ10, 177 P.3d 637, citing State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT APP 9, | 9 , 84 P.3d 854.
Because the sentence is not supported by an instruction requiring each element of the
offense to be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the resulting sentence is
illegal. An illegal sentence may be corrected pursuant to the provisions of Rule 22(e)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Reversal of the dangerous weapon enhancement
verdict, and the sentence based thereon, is therefore required in order to prevent a
manifest injustice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Jesus Jimenez respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the convictions of homicide, murder, and aggravated robbery and remand
the case for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM "A"

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT |LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tJTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: D71906002 FS

JESUS A JIMENEZ,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DENO HIMONAS
September 18, 2008

PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Reporter: HARMON, KATIE
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A
Interpreter: Sonia Couillard (Spanish)
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: Spanish
Date of birth: February 17, 1985
Video
CHARGES
1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/25/2008 Guilty
2. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/25/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than six years and which may be ijife in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
Page 1

Case No: 071906002
Date:
Sep 18, 2008

To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
COURT ORDERS BOTH COUNTS RUN CONSECUTIVE.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
JESUS JEMENEZ

SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Board of Pardons to supervise any Restitution.
Defendant transported from ADC for sentencing.

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM "B"

V L h c l , "' S T R'CT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN2 5
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Skatejoflt^g °QUT
STATE OF UTAH,

JUHY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 071906002

JESUS A. JIMENEZ,
Hpn. Deno G. Himonas
Defendant,

INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to ilnstruct you as to the law that
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that lawf.
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following iten}s only into the jury room: the
jury instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and the verdict form.
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the juryrt>omis choose a "Foreperson".
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in
deciding what the verdict should be.
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration 0f the case. But don't make a
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other
than honest deliberation.
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification,
write a note and give it to the bailiff. I'll review it with the lawyerg and answer your question, if
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views
about anything other than the guilt or imiocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on
each element of the offense. If you all come to an agreement, then you've reached a verdict. At that
time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your decision. The
Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk
about the case v/ith anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Jesus Jimenez, is charged
in the Information with murder and aggravated robbery.
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts;
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information.
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the count contained in the Information and casts
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge, isn't any evidence of guilt or
even a circumstance that you should consider in determining guilt or innocence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the Court and other governmental agencies and
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law doesn't require proof that overcomes every possible
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant

is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the Other hand, you think there's a
real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not
guilty.
INSTRUCTION NO. 16: During the trial, the lawyers a^ked me to determine whether
certain evidence might be admitted. You're not to be concerned with the reasons for such requests
or rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether evidence is admissible is purely
a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I don't determine what
weight should be given such evidence, nor do I pass on the credibility of the witness. You're not to
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by me. As to any question
to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to wtiat the answer might have been
or as to the reason for the objection.
INSTRUCTION NO. 17: As I've previously explained, yoy're to try the issues of fact that
are presented by the allegations in the Information. You should perform this duty uninfluenced by
pity for or passion or prejudice against the defendant. The law fjorbids you to be governed by
sentiment, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the defendant
have a right to expect that you'll conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the
evidence and apply the law of the case, to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.
INSTRUCTION NO. 18: The evidence that you're to consider includes the testimony of
witnesses, exhibits received into evidence, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be
drawn from facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as stated in these instructions, and all of
the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby.
INSTRUCTION NO. 19: You should reconcile conflicts in the evidence as far as you
reasonably can. But where the conflicts cannot be reconciled, you're the final judges and must
determine from the evidence what the facts are. You should carefully and conscientiously consider
and compare all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on any
issue and determine therefrom what the facts are. You're not bound to believe witnesses unless their
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts afrd circumstances in evidence.
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against ^ fewer number, in accordance
with your honest convictions. If you believe a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any
material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such a witness, or you
may give it such weight as you think it's entitled to.
INSTRUCTION NO. 20: You're the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the
witnesses, you've a right to take into consideration their bias, interest in the result of the suit, or any
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. Y0u may consider the witnesses'
deportment on the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or
candor, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and thdr capacity to remember. You
should consider these matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances that you may
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21: The defendant isn't required to testify. The law expressly gives
the defendant the privilege of not testifying if he so chooses. And if the defendant hasn't taken the
witness stand, then you must not take that fact as any indication of guilt, nor should you indulge in
any presumption or inference adverse to the defendant by reason thereof. The burden remains with
the prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant testifies or not, to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
INSTRUCTION NO. 22: In determining any fact in this case, you shouldn't consider or
be influenced by anything I've said or done that you may interpret as indicating my views thereon.
You're the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine
the facts for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe I think. I haven't
intended to express any opinion on what the proof shows or doesn't show, or what are or what aren't
the facts in the case. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by my views.
INSTRUCTION NO. 23: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated
in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason,
you're not to single out any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others; rather, you're to
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. Also, the
order in which I've given the instructions has no significance as to their relative importance.
INSTRUCTION NO. 24: I've tried to give you instructions embodying all of the rules of
law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some
of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions that you reach as to what the facts are. As
to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion by
me that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to
a state of facts that you find doesn't exist, disregard the instruction.
INSTRUCTION NO. 25: Courts of justice recognize and admit two classes of evidence,
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the
prosecution or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence,
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required
by law. One class of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and
accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any of his/her own physical senses,
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and,
insofar as it shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove
by reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in
arriving at a verdict.
INSTRUCTION NO. 26: I've permitted you to take notes. Many courts don't, and a word
of caution is in order. There's always a tendency to attach undue importance to matters that one has
written down, but some testimony that's considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not

written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented.
Consequently, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you shouldn't
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating
the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline
of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all^ your memory should be your
greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case.
INSTRUCTION NO. 27: You shouldn't consider as evidence any statement of counsel
made during the trial unless such statement was made as a stipulatiqn conceding the existence of a
fact or facts.
INSTRUCTION NO. 28: To constitute the crime charged in the Information, there must
be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate
culpable mental state or states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may
be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the Information and that the defendant
committed such conduct with the culpable mental state required for such offense.
INSTRUCTION NO. 29: The intent with which an act is dc^ne denotes a state of mind and
connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by
direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, and
circumstances.
INSTRUCTION NO. 30: A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent, or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. A person engages in
conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances.
A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result olf his conduct when he is aware
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
INSTRUCTION NO. 31: Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is
done or omitted. Motive is not an element of any offense, and helice need not be proven. The
motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your
determination of state of mind or intent.
INSTRUCTION NO. 32: "On or about" includes any day ihat closely approximates or is
near the day alleged in the Information. "Conduct" means an act or omission. "Act" means a
voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. "Omission" means a failure to act when there is
a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting.

INSTRUCTION NO.

33

Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO

3^/

In this action the only
defendant on trial is Jesus A. Jimenez. You are not to concern yourselves with the status of the
case against the other defendant named in this trial.

INSTRUCTION NO. J ^
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of
Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in Count I of the information, you must find from all of
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that
offense :
1. On or about August 15, 2007;
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez;
4. As a party to the offense;
5. While in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the
commission or attempted commission of a robbery;
6. Caused the death of Faviola Hernandez.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of
each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in the information. If, on the other
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.

l

INSTRUCTION NO. >^
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of Aggravated
Robbery, as charged in Count II of the information, you must find ftom all of the evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1. On or about August 15, 2007;
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez;
4. As a party to the offense;
5. Took, or, attempted to take, personal property from the person or immediate presence
of Faviola Hernandez; and
6. That such taking was unlawful; and
7. That such taking was intentional; and
8. That such taking was against the will of Faviola Hernandez; and
9. That such taking was accomplished by means offeree or fear; and
10. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was used; and/or
11 Caused the serious bodily injury to Faviola Hernandez.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this c^se, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robber, as charged in the information. If, on the other
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one Or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3 7"

Under Utah law. Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking of
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits Aggravated Robbery if in
the course of committing Robbery, that person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or
causes serious bodily injury upon another.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3$f

You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon

INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ?
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal
justification, or, illegal.
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes money.

INSTRUCTION NO. JO
An act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of. or in the immediate flight after
the attempt or commission of a robbery.

121

INSTRUCTION NO.

Hi-

You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or furtherance of an
Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is subject to to an
enhanced penalty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

_L^U

You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robberyoccurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced
penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah
Law, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

1.

A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the

Aggravated Robbery.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced
of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If, on the other hand, you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that
the defendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty.
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Utah Statutes
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Utah Statutes
TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 5 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
PART 2 CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 . Murder.
(1)

As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:

(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), yriien the victim is
younger than 18 years of age;
(c)

kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;

(d)

child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;

(e)

aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;

(f)

rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;

(g)

object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;

(h)

sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;

(i)

forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;

{j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual afyuse of a child under
Section 76-5-404.1;
(k)

rape under Section 76-5-402;

(1)

object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;

(m)

forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;

(n)

aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-4)05;

(o)

arson under Section 76-6-102;

(p)

aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;

(q)

burglary under Section 76-6-202;

(r)

aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;

(s)

robbery under Section 76-6-301;

(t)

aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302;

(u)

escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8|-309; or

(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding
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discharge of a firearm or dangerous weapon.
(2)

Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:

(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of
another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any
predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed
in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the
predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the
commission or attempted commission of:
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under
Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense
is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is
established under Section 76-5-205.5.
(3)(a)

Murder is a first degree felony.

(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which
may be for life.
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted
murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause
the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is
a reasonable explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not
legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection

(4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:

(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in
Section 76-2-305; or
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(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own
conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse und^r
Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actpr under Subsection
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the
then existing circumstances.

(4)(a)(i

(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as fallows:
(i)
(ii)

murder to manslaughter; and
attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes
a separate offense does not merge with the crime of murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense
described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also
be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense.

Copyright © 2009 Loislaw.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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Utah Statutes
d

Utah Statutes

Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
Q CHAPTER 6 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
Q PART 3 ROBBERY

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if m
robbery, he:

the course of committing

(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601;
(b)

causes serious bodily injury upon another; or

(c)

takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.

(2)

Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.

(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in
the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.
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Utah Statutes
Q Utah Statutes
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
Q CHAPTER 6 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
Cl PART 3 ROBBERY

7 6 - 6 - 3 0 1 . Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from |iis person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of fofce or fear, and with a
purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently Or temporarily of the
personal property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses forte or fear of immediate
force against another in the course of committing a iheft or wrongful
appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful
appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appror. "ation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
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Utah Statutes
Q

Utah Statutes

Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
Cl CHAPTER 3 PUNISHMENTS
Q PART 2 SENTENCING

76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute
provides otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may
be for life.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute
provides otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15
years.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute
provides otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years.
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Utah S t a t u t e s
Q

Utah Statutes

Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
Q CHAPTER 3 PUNISHMENTS
E3 PART 2 SENTENCING

dangerous weapon used.
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition
as in Section 76-1-601.
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a felony, the court:
(a) (i) shall increase by oi le year the minimum term of the sentence
applicable by law; and
(ii) if the minimum te r m a p p J i c a b J e b } J a i J" :i s z e r o,
term as one year; and

s h a I ] s e 1: 1: h e m :i i I i rn urn.

(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence appl i cab J e by J aw :i r i
the case of a felony of the second or third degree.
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the
felony; and
(1: •) 1:1 Ie d e f e n d a n t ki Iew

11: Iat

11 Ie dangerous weapon was present.

(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person
has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a
dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony
and that person is subsequently convicted of another felony in which a
dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed
including those in Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate prison term to
be not less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.

•-"•''? i-oislaw.com,
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Utah Statutes
Gl Utah Statutes

Cl TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
Q CHAPTER 2 PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Q PART 2 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for
conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission
of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
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Utah Statutes
Cl Utah Statutes
Q TITLE 76 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE
Cl CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
CJ PART 6 DEFINITIONS

/>« I! hll !

D e t i i n t in ni«.»

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and. includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility i s :i i I i s s i .< ; • i i I i
criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a ) ai I y i tem capabJ e of causii ig dea 1:h or serioi is bodi 1 y injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim veibally or in any other manner
that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means:
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402;
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402,1;
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;
i

• . ••

Id, Section 76-5-402.3;

(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2);
(f) s o d o m y < w i :hild, S e c t i o n 76-5-403.1;
('

;•3 - iv • •

. - ' a b I i s e <:> f a c 1 I i ] d, S u b s e c t i o i I 7 6 - 5 4 0 4 1 ( "I) ;

(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in
Subsections (6)(a) through (h); or
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United
States that, if committed in Utah, would constitute an offense described in
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(6)(a) through (i).

(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation,
government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting,
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being
preserved.
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Q

Rules of Criminal Procedure

Ri :i 3 € • 11 9

I in. s t:i: i i c t i ons .

(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court
may instruct the jury concerning the jurors 1 duties and conduct, the
order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged
crime, and the definitiqn of terms. The court may instruct the jury
concerning any matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by
the court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist
the jurors in comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in
writing and a copy provided to each juror. At the final pretrial
conference or at some other time as the court directs, a party may file
a written request that the court instruct the jury on the as set forth
in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a
requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish
the parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties
waive this requirement.
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on
the law if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the
case. Prior to giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the
parties of its intent to do so and of the content of the instructions. A
party may request an interim written instruction.
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court
instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same
time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The
court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request; and
it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties waive this requirement. Final instructions shall be in
writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The court shall
provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its discretion,
provide a copy to all jurors
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the
court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be
given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the
endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part was refused.
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the
instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions
may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires
to consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make
objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may
not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest unjustice. In stating
the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the objection
is made and the ground of the objection.
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence i n the case, and
if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the
jury that they are the exc1usive judges of a 1 1 questions of fact.
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(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court
has given the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)
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Rules of Criminal Procedure
Q

Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rale .2,

Sentence, judgment and commitment.

(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be
not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or
alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of
sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest
may be issued by the court.
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court
shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which
shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence.
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of
defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be
filed.
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise
the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction,
it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any
firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea
invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea,
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the
defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on
the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an i.1 legaJ sentei ice, : r a sei i tie rice imposed in
an illegal manner, at any time.
(fj upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the coui i. ^iiaiv
impose sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If
the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed • o
the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-16a-202(l) (b) , the coin t shall so specify in the
sentencing order
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996; .Amended
January 14, 2008, Effective January 1, 2008.)
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ADDENDUM "E"

You are instructed that under Utah law. it in the commission or furtherance of an
Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is si ib ject t : t : • a i
ei lhanced pei laity.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Ljl^

You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery
occurred, \ou must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced
penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah
Law. you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

1.

A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the

Aggravated Robbery.

If. after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced
of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If. on the other hand, you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that
the defendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty.

ADDENDUM "F"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.

k

Case No. 071906002
Jesus A. Jimenez,
Defendant.

1.

]

We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A.

Jimenez, (guiltyynot guilty (circle one) of Criminal Homicide, Murder,
a First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information.

DATED thisP^£> ~«day of Q T & U &

, 2008.

By.

igftr

deputy";

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,

VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs<
Case No. 071906002
Jesus A. Jimenez,
Defendant.

1.

We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A.

Jimenez, (guilts/not guilty -{circle one) of Aggravated Robbery, a
First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 2 of the Information.

(If

the answer to the foregoing question is "guilty", then proceed to 2.)

2.

We, the jurors in the above case,ffind^do not find (circle one)

that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of
the Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, charged in Count 2 of
the Information.

DATED this

2S*

day of

